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Abstract 
 
 
Contemporary metaphilosophical debates on the future of philosophy invariably include references to the 
natural sciences. This is wholly understandable given the cognitive and cultural authority of the sciences 
and their contributions to philosophical thought and practice. However such appeals to the sciences 
should be moderated by reflections on contingency of sciences. Using the work of contemporary 
historians and philosophers of science, I argue that an awareness of the radical contingency of science 
supports the claim that philosophy’s future should not be construed as either dependent or necessarily 
related to that of the sciences. Therefore contemporary debates – about the possibility of philosophy’s 
status as a science, say – should be tempered by an appreciation of the fact that science may cease to be a 
significant feature of future metaphilosophical debates. I conclude by considering the implications of this 
claim for assessments of the progressiveness of philosophy. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Contemporary debates about the nature and future of philosophy invariably include 
references to the natural sciences. The reasons for this are obvious enough. The natural 
sciences have, over their relatively short history, provided fantastic cognitive and 
practical resources to human beings. Those same sciences have also informed and, at 
times, seemed to foreclose longstanding philosophical debates about knowledge, 
reality, and human nature. The striking successes of the natural sciences soon began to 
inform philosophers’ reflections on the aims and purpose of their own activities. Such 
metaphilosophical ruminations are visible in the Enlightenment philosophes, positivists 
like Comte and his logical positivist heirs, and more recently in the broad programme 
of ‘philosophical naturalism’. 
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The aim of this paper is not to rehearse the historical story, interesting as it is. A 
vigorous school of historians of science and of philosophy is fulfilling that task, and my 
discussion will refer to them where appropriate (Gaukroger 2006). Nor is the purpose 
of this paper to deny the many and valued contributions that the sciences have made to 
philosophy. Certainly few philosophers would deny that sciences have, by way of data 
and theories, enriched and expanded the disciplines of metaphysics, philosophy of mind 
and language, and so on. Moreover, new areas of inquiry, like biolinguistics, have 
emerged which would have been impossible without the provisions of the sciences. 
Recent interest in ‘experimental philosophy’ is yet another indication of the fruitful and 
ongoing interactions of philosophy and the sciences (Knobe and Nichols 2008). 
 
Two more caveats should be stated. First I will not define, in detail, terms such as 
‘science’ or ‘naturalism’, for the reason that my remarks upon contingency – which I 
introduce in a moment – would apply to even the more capacious definition of those 
terms. Second my discussion will not discuss the desirability (or not) of a future 
without science, or philosophy without naturalism. The reason is that such questions 
cannot be answered without close reference to the aims and explanatory interests of 
those future cultures which I discuss. Since no such reference can be made, any 
proposed answers to those questions would remain speculative at best. 
 
 
2. Contingency and Science 
 
With these provisos in place, my main claim can be stated. I argue that 
metaphilosophical debates about the relationship between science and philosophy 
should be informed by an issue which has become central in contemporary history and 
philosophy of science. That issue is contingency. It is important to define this term, for 
it has two senses, only one of which concerns me. The first sense of contingency refers 
to the fact that the material, social and intellectual conditions which accompanied and 
enabled the emergence of the modern sciences were contingent. That is, variations in 
those conditions would have affected the sorts of scientific practice and knowledge that 
emerged. Often, this is stated in the form of counterfactual speculations, for instance, 
the question of whether ‘other histories’ could have produced ‘other biologies’ (Radick 
2005). 
 
Over the last thirty years, historians and sociologists of science have provided ample 
and detailed documentation of the specific material, social and intellectual conditions 
which enabled, say, Newtonian physics or the molecular genetics (for representative 
studies, see Pickering 1984 and Cushing 1994). Contingency arises from a sensitive 
awareness of the fact that, had these conditions been otherwise, then it is quite possible 
that ‘other histories’ may have emerged. Let us call these ‘internal contingencies’. 
Recent philosophers of science have seized on internal contingencies as novel 
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opportunities to reflect upon longstanding philosophical questions; however, my 
interest is not with internal contingencies, despite the interesting philosophical 
problems they prompt (Soler 2008). 
 
Instead, my focus is on the second sense of contingency. I will call these ‘radical 
contingencies’, because they relate, not to variations within the histories of the sciences, 
but to the very existence of those sciences – and, therefore, of the histories which 
occupy historians and sociologists interested in internal contingencies. Of course, one 
can only investigate and document internal contingencies in the sciences if those 
sciences emerged in the first place and went on to have histories that later scholars 
could examine. For this reason, I judge radical contingencies to be fundamental and this 
is, in part, why my focus will be upon the implications of the radical contingency of 
science for metaphilosophical debates about the future of philosophy. 
 
It is safe to say that few philosophers have paid attention to the radical contingency of 
science. One honourable exception to this is Paul Feyerabend (1978: 228), who argued 
that ‘science as we know it today is not inescapable’, because human beings, at least in 
potential, ‘construct a world in which it plays no role whatever’. Another is Howard 
Sankey (2008: 263) who in a recent paper on contingency in science remarked that ‘[i]t 
is not inevitable that science will continue to be pursued by humans’. However such 
remarks have so far elicited little discussion amongst historians and philosophers of 
science. There are many possible reasons for the neglect of radical contingency, 
ranging from the entrenchment of the sciences themselves, or legitimate 
historiographical reasons (such as the epistemological issues raised by the practice of 
counterfactual history; for a useful discussion, see Radick 2008). The range and 
legitimacy of such reasons will not affect my argument. 
 
It is useful to distinguish two different forms of radical contingency. These are 
historical and futural, the former concerned with the historic past, and the latter with 
various possible futures. My discussion will treat both, for both historical and futural 
contingency have implications for metaphilosophical debates about science and 
philosophy. The main thought is this: the emergence and entrenchment of the sciences 
within our history was not an inevitable feature; or at the least, we cannot provide 
sufficient epistemic warrant to secure the claim of science’s inevitability.  
 
This denial of the inevitability of science should be elaborated. In the process I can 
rebut an obvious and wholly legitimate objection which runs as follows: given certain 
features of our evolutionary history, it was indeed inevitable that we should have 
evolved with capacities for curiosity and complex cognitive activity (owing to their 
survival value, say). An evolved cognitive capacity for complex epistemic activities is 
therefore an inevitable feature of our evolution, a distinctive feature of our ‘useful 
inheritance’, as Nicholas Rescher (1989) neatly puts it (see further Vollmer 2005). 
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However although these cognitive capacities for and predispositions to engage in 
complex epistemic activities is inevitable, the specific forms of which those activities 
could take remains contingency. The forms of scientific activities which emerged 
within the course of our history are the outcomes of interactions between our evolved 
cognitive capacities and an array of contingent environmental, social and historical 
factors (see further Sankey 2008 and Trizio 2008). 
 
So although science may be an inevitable feature of our development, the specific 
forms it takes remain grounded in a variety of contingencies; for instance, there is no 
inevitability in the fact that during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
naturalism became the idée fixe of science and (much of) philosophy. There is, after all, 
no one phenomenon called science, but rather a complex array of historically variable 
scientific traditions whose emergence and development depends upon a constellation of 
interacting material, social and intellectual factors (Galison and Stump 1996; Kellert, 
Longino and Waters 2006). Therefore the inevitabilist could assert that science was 
inevitable, but that is an uncontroversial point; the real issue turns on the inevitability, 
or not, of certain specific scientific theories and traditions – such as particle physics or 
naturalism. Yet to assert the inevitability of these one must have successfully performed 
a process of survey and comparison – of possible alternatives, of their content and 
consequences, over a long period of time – which they lack the cognitive powers to 
perform. 
 
Therefore science may have been an inevitable development but the specific forms of 
science are contingent. Compare this with language: given certain features of our 
cognitive and social evolution a capacity for language is evitable, but the specific 
content of that language is contingent upon a host of cultural and environmental factors. 
The distinction between the singular term science and the plural reference to sciences 
(or forms of scientific activity, or modes of inquiry) is a significant one; for instance, it 
could mark the difference between a scientific tradition receptive to teleological 
explanation and one which was not. Therefore one can accept the evolutionary 
argument that science, construed as epistemic activity, was inevitable, but this does not 
entail the further and more metaphilosophically significant question of what forms of 
science would, in fact, emerge and become entrenched. 
 
Historians and sociologists of science can document the contingencies that enabled the 
emergence of our sciences; but they cannot take the further step of asserting that our 
sciences – naturalistic ones, say – was a necessary or inevitable feature, both of ‘our’ 
history and of other, possible histories. The historical contingency of science can be 
recognised based upon an appreciation of the various contingent conditions which 
accompanied it. But the further step of asserting inevitability is an illegitimate one. It is 
therefore possible that, had certain historical conditions been otherwise, a non-
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naturalistic science could have emerged and become entrenched (one which could have 
sustained a more vigorous tradition of natural theology, say). 
 
The radical futural contingency of science appeals to similar epistemic conditions. 
Despite a widespread and apparently powerful presumption that the sciences will, bar 
catastrophe, persist into the future, one cannot issue epistemic warrant for the further 
claim that they, in fact, will. Impossible or implausible as it may seem, the sciences 
may, into the future, cease to be central and valued features of human cultures. It is 
therefore possible that, in the coming decades or centuries, the guiding values and 
concerns of human beings may change, either gradually or suddenly. That is a truism as 
it stands, but it becomes more significant when one considers that certain of these 
changes have strong metaphilosophical implications. If into the future human beings 
begin to prioritise moral values over cognitive values, this will affect judgements about 
the progressiveness of science and philosophy: the sciences may seem less salient 
because their animating values are cognitive, whereas philosophy may find itself newly 
revitalised by these revived ethical sensibilities.  
 
Such changes in the guiding values and concerns of human cultures therefore affect 
their definitions of progressiveness: in contemporary societies practical and cognitive 
values enjoy considerable prestige and this renders the sciences highly progressive. 
However, should the priority of practical and cognitive values change into the future, 
the sciences will find judgements about their progressiveness shift accordingly – 
perhaps to the advantage of philosophy, a point I return to in section four.  
 
 
3. Values and the Future of Science 
 
It is worth dwelling on this idea of radical futural contingency. Contemporary 
developed world societies place a considerable value upon scientific knowledge and 
products. Indeed, such enthusiasm is evident also in ‘developing’ societies, where, for 
example, one finds the application of science and technology to agriculture, 
environmental management, and energy production. The ubiquity of science and its 
products might prompt us to imagine that, into the future, the central and privileged 
status of science in human cultures will remain. However, that presumption can be 
challenged by historical and philosophical considerations. There are many examples of 
cultures and communities, both historical and contemporary, whose valuations of the 
sciences are divergent from our own. These can be gathered under two labels.  
 
The ‘indifferentists’ include those for whom scientific practices and products invite 
little if any interest or significance. Some examples might include the early Daoists, 
many Amish communities, and those for whom the cognitive and practical imperatives 
manifested in the sciences lack salience. For these indifferentists, science – its theories, 
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technologies, and the like – simply fail to resonate with their values and projects. Two 
scholars of Amish culture speak for the indifferentists at large when they write that a 
rejection of science and technology does not necessarily reflect ‘ignorance or blind 
submission to tradition’ (Olshan 1994: 29), but, rather, is ‘in keeping with their own 
definition of what kind of life is appropriate’, the result being ‘a certain conception of 
life’ from which science and technology are largely absent (Ellul 1964: 29). The 
cognitive and practical interests manifested in the sciences may fail to excite those 
whose goals and projects are invested in moral and religious concerns (soteriological, 
for instance). The theories and technologies afforded by the sciences command no more 
interest for the indifferentists than, say, soteriological concerns do within secular 
societies. 
 
The ‘corruptionists’ are, by contrast, far from indifferent to science. They view some or 
all of its practices, values, and products as active and tangible sources of moral, 
intellectual or spiritual corruption. The ranks of the corruptionists include Rousseau 
(1750/1987), who argued that the sciences reflect and encourage the vices of ‘sloth’ and 
‘vanity’, or Kierkegaard (1996: 237), who warned that ‘[i]n the end all corruption will 
come from the natural sciences’ (see further Kidd 2011). Other corruptionists include 
the Gnostics and various Platonist and Neo-Platonist figures, each articulating a worry 
that undue practical and cognitive interest in the world threatened to distort our 
appreciation of the morally and ontologically demoted status of the empirical world. 
Plotinus (1993: §§I.6.5-6.6, II.9), for instance, urged us to remain aware that matter is 
of an ‘alien nature’, in contrast to the ‘purity of the soul’. Our failure to exercise due 
moral and epistemic caution – by engaging in scientific inquiries, say – risked our 
becoming ‘tainted’ by matter, as if ‘immersed in filth’. Of course Plotinus did not have 
modern science in mind, but it is not difficult to appreciate how the concerns he voices 
about the moral and spiritual risks arising from sustained engagement with the 
empirical world could translate into a far cooler attitude towards the sciences that that 
which currently prevails.  
 
The ranks of the corruptionists therefore include all those who view the cognitive and 
cultural authority of the sciences as an impediment or threat to higher-order moral and 
religious concerns. Corruptionist critiques of science reflect a diverse and 
heterogeneous array of concerns, so should not be construed as anything like a shared 
‘program’. Certainly there are important differences between the specific philosophical 
and political concerns about science and technology entertained by nineteenth century 
Luddites, the Unabomber, and contemporary ecofeminists. There are many ways for 
persons and communities to generate corruptionist criticisms and many ways that such 
criticisms can be expressed, such as breaking machines, domestic terrorism or more 
morally and intellectual mature strategies such as social activism and a renovation of 
older religious and poetic sensibilities. However, the various groups collected under 
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that label all articulate worries about they perceive as the deleterious moral and cultural 
implications of modern science. 
 
The appeal to indifferentists and corruptionists is intended to make two points. Both are 
related to the stability of valuations of the sciences. Firstly, they demonstrate that there 
are conveyable ‘forms of life’ which afford different degrees of significance to the 
natural sciences. Even if the values and concerns of such cultures seem too remote from 
our own, the fact of the possibility of alternative conceptions of the significance of the 
sciences remains. Secondly, our awareness of indifferentist and corruptionist 
communities should remind us that they exist as possible future forms of our own 
culture. Into the future, human cultures which currently esteem the sciences may 
become indifferentists or corruptionists; indeed, earlier periods of our own intellectual 
and cultural history evidenced just such attitudes. Sudden or gradual changes in the 
values and concerns of contemporary cultures could provoke radical reappraisals of 
how and why scientific practices and products matter. Into the future, then, there is no 
guarantee that ours will remain a ‘scientific culture’ in any recognisable sense.  
 
There are a wide variety of conceivable scenarios regarding what one might call a 
‘post-scientific’ culture. Such a diversity of possibilities reflects the complexity and 
mutability of the term ‘science’. Into the future, fundamental disciplinary restructuring 
could transform the sciences such that, to our eyes, they represent an entirely new 
tradition. Or certain forms of science, such as technologically complex ‘Big Science’ 
could cease, prompting a reorganisation in the modes of scientific activity a culture can 
engage in. Or the priority assigned to the different disciplines may see practicable 
subjects with strong moral value, like biomedical science, being promoted almost to the 
exclusion of, say, mathematical physics or cosmology. More radical scenarios can also 
be imagined; for instance, science may lose its status as a privileged cognitive 
authority, perhaps existing alongside newly empowered theological or philosophical 
traditions. Or certain areas of the sciences may integrate with the theological traditions, 
creating a tradition better described as ‘natural theology’ rather than ‘natural science’. 
Or perhaps certain definitive features of contemporary science – such as its naturalism 
– are abandoned in favour of a more ambitious metaphysics. Or a final possibility may 
see the sciences persisting, but only as curious artefacts of an older culture, such that 
their cognitive authority is greatly muted.  
 
 
4. The Persistence of Science 
 
These are just a few possibilities which can be generated by reflection on the radical 
futural contingency of science. Today, they may sound utterly implausible and be 
regarded with scepticism, even when they are presented as speculative possibilities. 
However, they are all possible, since they reflect the claim – defended earlier – that the 
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value and centrality of the sciences depends upon historically and culturally variable 
goals and projects. Changes in these goals and projects – such as a shift away from 
industrial and economic imperatives – will likely affect the resources and significance 
assigned to the sciences. Even cognitive values which are less obviously connected to 
social institutions and activities can be affected by the contingency of goals and 
projects. For example, the cognitive value of truth could return to earlier conceptions 
when truth and understanding are necessarily defined by theological concerns. In such a 
society, inquiry into the natural world could be defined by religious imperatives – a 
greater understanding of God’s creation, say. Within such a society, truth, and 
knowledge could be conceived in a way that rendered their association with scientific 
inquiry unsustainable, even unintelligible.  
 
The foregoing remarks on the radical futural contingency of science were intended to 
make the following point. There can be no epistemic warrant for the claim that the 
sciences will remain central and valued features of future human cultures. A wide 
variety of possible scenarios support the claim that the cognitive and cultural authority 
of the sciences may radically change into the future. The nature and likelihood of these 
changes cannot be specified in advance; a radical contingentist cannot issue 
probabilities or timelines for these possible scenarios. The reason, of course, is that 
such prognostications would rely upon one’s successful performance of a survey and 
comparison of all possible future intellectual and cultural developments.  
 
No human individual or community could possibly possess the privileged cognitive 
capacities that would enable them to perform such surveys and comparisons. The 
successful performance of those cognitive activities is necessary if the claim of 
science’s persistence into the future is to be warranted. However, as David E. Cooper 
(2002: 206) puts it, that warranted claim could be made ‘only [by] a creature possessed 
of cognitive powers far beyond our human capacities’. Cooper reiterates the complexity 
of those surveys and the corresponding sophistication of the cognitive capacities 
required: 
 
Only a creature capable of imagining in detail a complex, centuries-long 
development of these alternative ‘programmes’ – of knowing their implications, 
problems , and of comparing them to one another and to our own entrenched 
scientific account – could be in a position sensibly to judge that science has the 
edge. But none of us even approximates to being such a creature, equipped with 
such magisterial powers of knowledge (Cooper, 2010: 3) 
 
Cooper concludes that no one could make the warranted claim that science will persist 
as a feature of future human cultures. There have been and continue to be indifferentist 
and corruptionist cultures and communities and even cultures strongly shaped by 
science, like our own, contain indifferentist and corruptionist elements. Furthermore an 
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inability to conceive of a post-scientific culture is not an argument against its 
possibility: a little imagination and acquaintance with history can furnish one with 
possibilities (see Tibbets’ [1976] criticism of Feyerabend for an example).  
 
It is worth summarising the foregoing argument for the radical futural contingency of 
science. Once that is done, I will conclude by suggesting how it should inform 
metaphilosophical debates about the future relationship, if any, between science and 
philosophy. The argument is: 
 
The emergence and entrenchment of the sciences within early modern European culture 
was a ‘contingent’ historical and intellectual development.  
The continued establishment and extension of scientific knowledge and practices within 
and beyond Western cultures is also contingent; for instance, upon particular, ongoing 
political and economic imperatives.  
Changes, dramatic or gradual, in Western cultural, intellectual, political or other factors 
can and will affect appraisals of the value and centrality of the sciences within 
modernity.  
Such changes can, of course, occur, and doubtlessly will do. 
 
Therefore: 
There is no good reason to suppose that the sciences will continue to play a central, or 
even a peripheral, role within (some or all) future world cultures.  
No guarantee can be issued that contemporary forms of science will continue to play a 
central and integral role in future world culture. Future developments may see minor 
changes in those sciences (such as the modification of theories), or more dramatic 
changes (such as the abandonment of naturalism in favour of revised supernaturalist 
science). No one could possibly be in the privileged cognitive or empirical position to 
make such a judgement—and to claim otherwise is, as Cooper (2002: 202f) puts it, to 
be guilty of ‘hubris’.  
 
This conclusion that the content and salience of the sciences may dramatically change 
into the future has implications for contemporary metaphilosophical debates about 
science and philosophy. In the next section I consider just one of them: namely, that the 
future may see the emergence of philosophical traditions which are judged to be 
progressive but from which the sciences are absent.  
 
 
5. Science, Naturalism, and Hubris 
 
My opening remark stressed the place of science within contemporary reflections on 
the nature and future of philosophy. This is evident from energetic debates about 
whether philosophy is or could be a science, or whether philosophical naturalism 
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represents the future of philosophy. Such debates are sufficiently familiar that they need 
little further elaboration; however, a common feature of these debates is the 
presumption that science will continue to play a role in metaphilosophical debate. I 
readily concede that that presumption is justified for the immediate future. But what if, 
into the distant future – measured in centuries rather than decades, say – the sciences 
do, in fact, cease to be central and valued features of human cultures?  
 
Many possibilities offer themselves. I will consider just two of them. The first is that 
the dissolution of our ‘scientific culture’ would doubtless provide a rich topic of inquiry 
for philosophers (alongside historians and others). Certainly one can imagine ethicists 
and philosophers of science vigorously debating how and why the sciences ceased to be 
central and valued features of that culture. And metaphysicians, philosophers of mind 
and others could face lively debates about how their inquiries will proceed without 
input from newly disenfranchised sciences, like physics or neurophysiology. It is 
unlikely that broad areas of philosophy will simply ‘shut down’, since metaphysics and 
philosophy of mind, to take two examples, antedate the emergence of the sciences. 
Furthermore there are viable alternative candidates to naturalised metaphysics and 
philosophy of mind which maintain that although philosophy and the sciences should 
interact, the former should not be subordinated to the latter (see, for example, 
Corradini, Galvan, and Lowe 2006; Horst 2007). By subordinating philosophy to 
science we would, as Henri Bergson (1920: 208) warned, have ‘sacrificed philosophy 
without any appreciable gain to science’. Only an exaggerated estimation of the 
dependence of philosophy upon science could sustain the worry that the passage of 
science would threaten or necessitate an ‘end of philosophy’. 
 
The second is that philosophers in a ‘post-scientific’ culture will have no cognitive and 
cultural authorities to respond to. These may include newly revived theological and 
philosophical authorities, or quite different modes of inquiry and forms of knowledge 
currently unimaginable by us, today. The form and nature of such authorities is, again, 
a matter for speculation, but it is worth reiterating that earlier generations of inquirers – 
including some surprisingly historically recent – did not anticipate the emergence of 
our scientific culture. Therefore, our inability to imagine novel forms of cognitive and 
cultural authority is an indication of our due humility, rather than a barrier to their 
impossibility.  
 
Of course, the shift to a ‘post-scientific culture’ would perhaps render certain 
philosophical ‘research programmes’ untenable. Naturalism in metaphysics and the 
philosophy of mind, for instance, could cease to be plausible ways of conceiving of, or 
pursuing philosophy within a ‘post-scientific society’. A comparison could be drawn 
here with the gradual disappearance of providential and teleological reasoning from 
philosophy since the eighteenth century. Nowadays, appeals to divine purpose may 
seem trite, perhaps absurd, in a way that just a few hundred years ago would have been 
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so natural and intelligible that drawing attention to them may have seemed unnecessary 
and pedantic. 
 
The changes in the aims and nature of philosophy within a post-scientific culture would 
therefore also have positive effects. It would enable new forms of philosophical thought 
and practice, based both upon reflection on the passage of the sciences and critical 
engagement with the tradition (or traditions) that replaces them. There is, therefore, no 
basis to the worry that a ‘post-scientific’ culture would be philosophically 
impoverished, despite the ambitious rhetoric of some contemporary philosophical 
naturalists. Certainly the proposal that the future of philosophy depends upon its close 
and increasing association with the natural sciences should be greatly moderated. Two 
contemporary philosophers of science, for instance, remarked that the modern sciences 
are ‘the great epistemic enterprise of modern civilization’ and urge that any discipline 
which fails to conform to its strictures therefore ‘fails to qualify as part of the 
enlightened pursuit of truth, and should be discontinued’ (Ladyman and Ross 2007: 61, 
vi, 310; see Kidd 2009). This proposal is, of course, contingent upon the continuing 
value and salience of scientific knowledge and practices into the future—and that is far 
from certain. At the least, the claim that those intellectual disciplines and practices 
which cannot be successfully accommodated by the sciences should be ‘discontinued’ 
is both disturbing and arrogantly pre-emptive. A wide variety of possible future 
scenarios could see the cognitive and cultural authority of the sciences change to the 
point where such naturalistic vainglory appears not only untenable, but also absurd. 
 
Kant had issued warnings against such hubris in the classic essay ‘What is 
Enlightenment’. In that short work, Kant argued ‘[a]n age cannot bind itself and ordain 
its (at best very occasional) knowledge’ because, in so doing, it illegitimately 
committed itself to the presumption that such knowledge would remain unaffected by 
future developments. The ‘descendents’ of that hubristic age, continued Kant, would be 
‘fully justified in rejecting those decrees as having been made in an unwarranted and 
malicious manner’ (Kant 1784/1995: 4). Such ordinations are unwarranted for the 
reasons outlined earlier regarding what Cooper calls ‘hubris’. Furthermore they are 
‘malicious’ because they might deny future generations the opportunities to determine 
their own traditions of inquiry, in line with Kant’s emphasis upon the importance of 
individual rational and moral autonomy. From Kant, therefore, one should take the 
point that one cannot and should not presume the persistence of our own knowledge 
and associated traditions into the future.  
 
 
6. Philosophical Pluralism and Progress 
 
I have argued that reflections on the radical contingency of the science should inform 
metaphilosophical debates about the future of philosophy. The efficacy of the sciences 
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notwithstanding, certain radical contingencies accompanying the emergence of the 
sciences should encourage us to resist ambitious attempts to turn philosophy into a 
science. Put another way, the future relationship between philosophy and science 
should not be construed as one of gradual assimilation or convergence. I would 
therefore urge us to remain cautious even about such moderate naturalist claims as that 
‘philosophical inquiry should be both modelled on the methods of the successful 
sciences, and, at a minimum, consistent with the results of those sciences’ (Leiter 
2006b: 277). If the foregoing remarks are correct, then future cultures may afford no 
privileged authority to the sciences, such that those proposals, whether of imitation or 
consistency, would be groundless. 
 
Those engaged in contemporary metaphilosophical debates should bear in mind the fact 
that those sciences, first, may not have emerged and, second, may not persist as features 
of future human cultures. To invest the future of philosophy in one radically contingent 
tradition – namely, the modern sciences – is an unwise policy. It is far wiser for us to 
keep our epistemic options open rather than pre-emptively commit ourselves to a 
delimited set of possibilities for the future of philosophy. Indeed, future generations 
may regard our contemporary metaphilosophical reflections on philosophical 
naturalism as an anomalous period in the history of philosophy. If this is the case, then 
the question of how, if at all, philosophy can be construed as progressiveness should be 
revisited.  
 
Many naturalists have supposed that progress in philosophy will, if anything, consist of 
its ongoing integration with the accepted body of scientific knowledge or in the 
increasing alignment of philosophical and scientific methodology. Ladyman and Ross, 
for instance, explicitly state that any philosophical theories or disciplines which cannot 
be reconciled with a naturalistic framework should be ‘discontinued’. On those strict 
naturalistic terms, many areas of philosophy will seem non-progressive; for instance, 
the various contemporary non-naturalistic ethical and metaphysical systems. Such 
judgements turn on the claim that philosophical progress is defined, to a greater or 
lesser degree, by values drawn from or analogous to the sciences.  
 
Many philosophers have rightly criticised such judgements because of the intolerably 
narrow conception of the aims and value of philosophy it requires. Wittgenstein (1980: 
§§ 36, 49), for example, records his hostility towards such implicit scientism when he 
remarks that ‘people nowadays think that scientists exist to instruct them’, thereby 
forgetting that ‘poets [and] musicians’ may also have ‘something to teach them’. And 
he goes on to warn that ‘the age of science and technology’ may the ‘beginning of the 
end for humanity’, as ‘our disgusting, soapy water science’ drowns out all else that is 
good and valuable in human life: namely, richer conceptions of philosophy and human 
life, unencumbered by illegitimate commitments to the strictures of natural science. 
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My remarks about the contingency of science should indicate the importance of 
preserving and respective metaphilosophies which allow for conceptions of 
philosophical progress which do not depend upon the sciences. Although there are 
useful ways in which philosophers can progress by drawing upon the sciences, the 
progressiveness of philosophy is, ultimately, an autonomous issue. The ongoing 
importation of empirical knowledge into philosophy is an instance of progress, 
especially in disciplines like the philosophy of mind. Similarly, new scientific 
developments – in engineering and neuroscience – are sustaining vigorous new 
philosophical debates in their own right, and this is a phenomenon hardly confined to 
contemporary times. So philosophy can progress by engaging with the sciences; 
however, this does not entail that philosophy cannot progress without those sciences, or 
that philosophical progress is impossible in the absence of science. 
 
To demonstrate this point, one can gesture to those venerable traditions which offer a 
range of alternative metaphilosophies which sponsor quite different conceptions of 
philosophical progress. I will consider three: the spiritual, the cosmopolitan, and the 
humane. Pierre Hadot (1995) has interpreted ancient Greek philosophy as a series of 
‘spiritual exercises’ manifesting in a certain ‘way of life’. Kant (2004: 538) described a 
‘cosmopolitan’ sense in philosophy, focusing the questions: ‘What can I know? What 
ought I to do? What may I hope? What is man?’ More recently, Bernard Williams 
(2006) and John Cottingham (2009) have elaborated a new conception of ‘humane 
philosophy’ which is defined in contradistinction to prevailing images of philosophy 
modelled on the sciences. This conception of philosophy is directed towards the ‘wide 
humanistic enterprise of making sense of ourselves and of our activities’ (Williams, 
2006: 197). It is ‘a way of trying to reach an integrated view of the world: in our 
philosophical activity’, one which is ‘synthetic in its methods, synoptic in its scope, 
culturally and historically aware in its outlook, open to multiple resonances of meaning’ 
(Cottingham, 2009: 254). These three possibilities may be related, or distinct, but they 
make the important point that there are available conceptions of the nature, aims, and 
value of philosophy which allow for its progressiveness without tying it to the natural 
sciences.  
 
The question of the possibility of philosophical progress turns on its relationship to the 
sciences. This point is well made by a figure cited earlier in this paper. Recall that I 
described Kierkegaard as a corruptionist because of his remark that the natural sciences 
were doomed to be the source of ‘all corruption’. It is time to elaborate upon this 
remark, whose meaning is subtler than a mere hostility towards scientism. The specific 
worry that Kierkegaard pushes is that the natural sciences only become ‘dangerous and 
pernicious’ when they ‘encroach upon the sphere of the spirit’: ‘Let it deal with plants 
and animals and stars in that way; but to deal with the human spirit in that way is 
blasphemy, which only weakens ethical and religious passion’ (quoted in Carlisle 2006: 
65). Kierkegaard is, therefore, critical of the sciences only when they exceed their 
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proper bounds and jeopardise human moral and religious sensibilities – ‘the sphere of 
spirit’. The point is that progress, in philosophy and in science, can only be ensured if 
the neither is slave to the other: the natural sciences only become a source of 
‘corruption’ when philosophy is surrendered to them. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Engagement with the sciences is therefore neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for philosophical progress. Spiritual, cosmopolitan and humane philosophy can be 
progressive – enabling a ‘way of life’, answering Kant’s four questions, or addressing 
issues of vital human importance – but which are not shackled to the sciences. The 
philosophical traditions which those alternative metaphilosophies could sponsor would 
not, of course, ignore or neglect the sciences, but nor would their own integrity and 
progressiveness be determined by them. Certainly they indicate that there is no warrant 
for the philosophical naturalists’ insistence that we ‘either … adopt and emulate the 
method of successful sciences, or … operate in tandem with the sciences, as their 
abstract and reflective branch’ (Leiter 2006a: 236) 
 
The foregoing remarks do not exhaust the complex metaphilosophical issues 
concerning the relationship between science and philosophy. However they should 
indicate that stronger forms of philosophical naturalism, which allege that philosophy’s 
future is intimately bound up with that of science, are unwarranted. Alternative 
conceptions of the nature and aims of philosophy are available, each of which could 
sponsor notions of philosophical progress that are, perhaps, more closely allied with the 
spiritual, cosmopolitan or humane functions which philosophy can aspire to fulfil. If 
this is so, then into the future philosophy could be judged as progressive, but those 
judgements are not necessarily intimately invested in its engagement with and 
investment in the sciences. 
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